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Strock v. Independent School District No. 281, Robbinsdale: US District Court : EDUCATION - IDEA claim fails on merits; jurisdiction, ripeness, etc. discussed

1Plaintiffs’ initial complaint was filed with the Minnesota
Department of Education. On June 16, 2006, Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Kathleen D. Sheehy dismissed the case as moot due to
Kyle’s graduation.
Thereafter, on August 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed suit in
federal court. This Court found the administrative record
insufficient, and on March 5, 2007, granted plaintiffs’ motion for
partial summary judgment; remanded the case for a full
administrative hearing on plaintiffs’ IDEA claims; and made no
definitive rulings on plaintiffs’ other claims or on defendants’
motion to dismiss.
A full administrative hearing was held April 17-19, 2007,
resulting in a 28-page decision issued by Judge Sheehy on May 16,
2007.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
06-CV-3314(JMR/FLN)
Kyle Anthony Strock et al. )
)
v. ) ORDER
)
Independent School District )
No. 281, Robbinsdale, )
Minnesota et al. )
Plaintiffs, Kyle Strock and his father, Timothy Strock, have
filed a supplemental complaint1 alleging defendants, Independent
School District No. 281, Robbinsdale, Minnesota; Linda Johnson,
Board Member; and Stan F. Mack, Superintendent of Schools (“the
District”) violated the (1) Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”); (2) Rehabilitation Act § 504; (3) Americans With
Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and (4) Minnesota Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”). Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”).
Defendants’ motion is granted.
2“NC” means no credit, or failure.
2
I. Background
In June, 2004, Kyle Strock transferred to Armstrong High
School, Independent School District No. 281. His father, Timothy
Strock, arranged for the transfer and provided the school with
Kyle’s background information. He advised school officials that,
although Kyle had been assessed or diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), he attended regular class, had no
special needs, and had not received special education. District
Exhibit (“Dist. Ex.”) 9, 12. Timothy Strock gave the school nurse
a health form which said Kyle had ADHD, but did not take any
regular medication. Student Exhibit (“Student Ex.”) D89.
A. Kyle’s Junior Year
During his first semester, Kyle took the following courses and
earned these grades:
Psychology DJapanese
I NC2
Chemistry (2 cr) C
World Religions C
High Algebra I NC
Dist. Ex. 523.
In some classes, Kyle’s grades were caused by his failure to
submit homework assignments; in others, he performed poorly on
tests. Student Exs. D12-13, D16, D18, D89.
3Minnesota students must pass these tests before they are
permitted to graduate.
4Kyle’s math score indicated he was on par with 11th grade
students statewide. Dist. Exs. 526, 584; see also Tr. 113. On the
written composition test, he received the same passing score as the
majority of students at Armstrong High School.
3
Mr. Strock asked Kyle’s teachers for more information about
missing assignments. At the end of the semester, Mr. Strock met
with Kyle’s guidance counselor, who agreed to meet with Kyle more
frequently the following semester. Although Mr. Strock knew the
school offered special education, he did not discuss it or seek any
accommodation for Kyle at this meeting. Dist. Ex. 114; Transcript
(“Tr.”) 682. Mr. Strock believed special education was
stigmatizing and inappropriate for a student with good
intelligence. Tr. 679.
Early in 2005, Kyle passed Minnesota’s Basic Skills Tests3 in
math, reading, and written composition.4 Dist. Exs. 35-36. In
March and April, 2005, Kyle’s guidance counselor met with him
regarding missing assignments. Dist. Exs. 116-17. Kyle said he
had not been motivated to complete his homework, but he would make
an effort in the future to submit his assignments on time. Id.
The next semester, Kyle took the following courses and earned
these grades:
Creative Fiction Writing DMulticultural
Literature NC
Network Web Design D+
4
Computer Graphic Design NC
Japanese 1 II NC
High Algebra NC
Dist. Ex. 523.
Kyle’s grades in Multicultural Literature, Japanese, and
Algebra were again primarily based on his failure to turn in
assignments. In Creative Writing, he received good grades on the
assignments he submitted on time, but less credit when they were
late. During the semester’s first quarter, Kyle received mostly
A’s in Network Design, but his final grade suffered because he
failed to turn in one large project and four other assignments.
Student Exs. D22-23.
During this time, Kyle worked at Cub Foods. His work was
restricted to four or fewer shifts per week (12 to 16 hours). Near
the end of his junior year, largely due to his father’s concerns
about his grades, Kyle reduced his schedule to weekend shifts. Tr.
662-63.
On August 8, 2005, the summer following his junior year, Kyle
saw his family doctor regarding his school performance. The doctor
recommended a formal evaluation at the Alexander Center for Child
Development and Human Behavior and/or the Park Nicollet Adult
Mental Health Department. He explained that addressing Kyle’s
problems and setting up necessary interventions would take some
time. Dist. Exs. 500-501.
5Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides for
individualized plans designed to accommodate the unique needs of an
individual with a disability, and is required by the ADA.
5
B. Kyle’s Senior Year
1. Section 504 Accommodations
On August 20, 2005, Kyle’s father instructed the school to
release Kyle’s records to the Alexander Center. He also requested
that all of Kyle’s teachers complete assessment forms to assist
with the Center’s evaluation. After receiving the teachers’
responses, the guidance counselor forwarded the completed
assessment forms directly to the Center. Dist Ex. 120; Tr. 172-73.
On October 4, 2005, Kyle was evaluated by an Alexander Center
multi-disciplinary team. The team concluded that Kyle met the
criteria for ADHD, inattentive type, and recommended that he begin
taking appropriate medication and seek a § 504 plan5 at school to
accommodate his needs. The next day, Kyle began taking Concerta,
a prescription medication for ADHD. His recommended dosage was
gradually increased over the next few months. Student Ex. A44.
On October 18, 2005, Kyle’s father met with the school
guidance counselor to discuss the § 504 plan. Mr. Strock gave the
counselor a redacted version of the Alexander Center report,
including its ADHD diagnosis and plan recommendation, but excluding
the test results. Student Exs. A19-A21. On November 9, 2005, the
school’s § 504 committee, which included school guidance
counselors, a psychologist, a social worker, and an assistant
6The plan proposed (1) giving Kyle additional time on
assignments and tests, if requested; (2) seating him in a low
distraction work area; (3) giving Kyle reminders to stay on task,
if needed; and (4)communication from the school with his father, as
needed. It also proposed that Kyle record daily assignments in a
planner, request needed assistance, participate in study groups,
and be prepared to attend supplemental study hours before and/or
after school. Under the plan, Mr. Strock would monitor Kyle’s
grades and attendance using the school’s “parent-connect” website.
Dist. Ex. 49.
7Mr. Strock claimed a low distraction work area was
unacceptable because Kyle would be unable to sit by his friends.
He further claimed Kyle’s “situation [was] not a matter of
intelligence and tutoring, [rather] simply a matter of doing his
homework.” Lastly, he claimed it was unrealistic to hold Kyle
responsible for keeping track of his assignments. He proposed,
instead, that on a daily basis, Kyle’s teachers verify that his
assignments were written down and his materials were in his
backpack. Dist. Ex. 48.
6
principal, submitted a proposed plan6 to Mr. Strock. Mr. Strock
rejected it.7
The next day, the guidance counselor gave Mr. Strock a revised
plan, which he approved. As written, Kyle’s teachers would, upon
request, give Kyle additional time on assignments and tests, if
feasible; provide him with an extra set of class notes; allow Kyle
to take notes in class with his personal laptop; give him reminders
to stay on task; and communicate with his father as needed. Dist.
Ex. 51. That same day, the counselor circulated the final plan to
Kyle’s teachers.
After the revised plan was in place, problems persisted. For
example, in early December, 2005, Kyle’s father emailed Cindy
Smith, Kyle’s Western Civilization teacher, complaining that Kyle
8Kyle’s teachers promptly responded to Mr. Strock’s requests
for updates, identifying missing assignments and tests, and
allowing Kyle to revise and resubmit homework assignments. Student
Exs. M6-7
7
had not received full credit for a late-submitted assignment. Ms.
Smith said she would give Kyle extra points, but stated that
undefined due dates may not be the best way to help Kyle. She
recommended scheduling a time to meet with Kyle after school,
placing some limits on assignment deadlines to help him develop
better habits, and giving Kyle even more time to complete his work.
Kyle’s father replied that he had allowed the § 504 plan’s
“stigma” on Kyle’s record because he believed Kyle could submit
work without penalty, regardless of when he turned it in. Dist.
Ex. 146. He told Ms. Smith, “[f]rankly Cindy, at this point we are
not trying to help him develop better habits, we are simply trying
to help him graduate.” He also said he would remove Kyle from the
§ 504 plan and have the “stigma removed from his permanent record,
because it [was] obviously not a help.” These statements
notwithstanding, Ms. Smith felt the § 504 plan was helpful, and she
agreed to allow Kyle to submit assignments whenever he was able to
do so. Student Ex. A10. Kyle’s other teachers made similar
concessions.8
On January 23, 2006, Mr. Strock complained to an assistant
principal about the § 504 plan. He said it had not been
implemented in the classrooms, and he was frustrated that the
teachers took three to four days to respond, rather than 24 hours.
8
The school assigned a different guidance counselor to Kyle at
his father’s request. Student Ex. C4-5. The new counselor, Jamie
Dukowitz, continued the school’s efforts to accommodate Kyle’s
needs and sent copies of the § 504 plan to each of Kyle’s second
semester teachers. Dist. Exs. 54-55. On January 31, 2006, Mr.
Dukowitz scheduled a meeting with Kyle’s second semester teachers
to ensure they properly implemented the plan. Dist. Ex. 193.
After making these arrangements, and with Mr. Strock’s approval,
Mr. Dukowitz arranged for Kyle to take a one-credit work experience
course through Intermediate District No. 287, because Kyle was two
credits behind qualifying for spring graduation. Mr. Dukowitz also
arranged for Kyle to repeat the Multicultural Literature class he
failed the previous spring, this time as an independent study
course. Tr. 109-110.
2. Kyle’s Senior Year
Kyle’s first semester senior year grades were as follows:
Classic World Literature C
Contemporary World Lit. CHigh
Algebra DJapanese
B+
Western Civilizations D
World Geography D
Dist. Ex. 523-24; Student Ex. F40.
Kyle continued to submit late assignments and perform poorly
on tests, although there had been some improvement.
9COMPASS is an untimed computerized college evaluation test
used to place students into appropriate courses. The test covers
9
During his second semester, and under the § 504 plan, Kyle
earned the following grades:
Team and Life Sports AHigh
Algebra II D+
Sports and Leisure B
Japanese 1 II C
Sculpture and Ceramics B
Space and Weather BMulticultural
Literature C+
Dist. Ex. 524.
During the second semester, Kyle’s results improved because he
timely submitted assignments in most of his classes. In Algebra,
he turned in all but one assignment, but continued to perform
poorly on quizzes and tests. Student Exs. D4-D6.
When Kyle began his senior year, he ranked 467/548 in his
class, with a 1.838 grade point average. Kyle passed each part of
the Minnesota Basic Skills test, and scored in the average to
superior range on the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale. On June
2, 2006, Kyle completed high school with a cumulative GPA of 1.912,
slightly lower than the 2.00 GPA he presented when entering
Armstrong High School.
3. College Transition
On September 25, 2006, Kyle took COMPASS9 placement tests at
reading, writing, math, writing essay, and English as a second
language.
10“[T]his is not an unusual placement for incoming freshman
students [and] the college offers 20 sections of this course each
semester. At North Hennepin Community College, a school many
Armstrong graduates attend, approximately 60% of [these] students
take elementary algebra their first year.” (ALJ Decision, May 16,
2007).
10
Normandale Community College. Based on his scores, he was placed
in elementary-level algebra, a course for which he would receive no
college credit.10
Kyle’s writing scores qualified him for college-level Freshman
Composition with no further preparation. Tr. 114-16; Student Ex.
A79.
In spite of being allowed to enter community college, Kyle
elected against doing so. He opted, instead, to work as a
Blockbuster Video customer service representative and a Target
cashier. Tr. 567-68.
4. Administrative Proceedings and Findings
On April 3, 2006, approximately 60 days prior to his high
school graduation, Kyle filed a request for a due process hearing
with the Minnesota Department of Education seeking an expedited
special education evaluation. Notwithstanding his upcoming
graduation, he requested he be examined in order to be declared
eligible for special education. He also sought additional
accommodations allowing timely graduation and successful transition
to college. In this request, he claimed the District had reason to
11The District first filed a motion to dismiss the request for
hearing, alleging the complaint was insufficient. A hearing
officer denied the motion. (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, May
3, 2006). Later, on May 12, 2006, the District filed a motion to
assign the burden of persuasion to Kyle. This motion was also
denied. (Order Regarding District’s Motions to Assign Burden of
Persuasion, May 17, 2006).
11
suspect he suffered from a disability and needed special education,
but failed to make the appropriate evaluation. Kyle claimed his
poor school performance resulted from the District’s failure to
afford him sufficient support and services.
Specifically, Kyle demanded that the District accommodate him
by: (1) modifying its standard graduation requirements; (2)
modifying its grading and performance standards to grant him credit
for courses in which he had shown adequate performance; (3)
providing necessary compensatory education services; (4) omitting
from his transcript any indication of inability to perform at a
standardized level, absent support necessitated by his disability;
(5) affording him a timely graduation with his class; (6) giving
him necessary skills with which to transition to college; and (7)
ensuring, at a minimum, that he be allowed to participate in the
spring graduation ceremony. Alternatively, if the evaluation he
demanded did not find him eligible for special education, he sought
a revised § 504 plan with identical accommodations.
The District performed the requested special education
evaluation.11 On April 25, 2006, Kyle signed a consent form which
allowed the District’s physician and mental health professional,
12
Dr. Thomas Gratzer, to verify his ADHD diagnosis. Kyle and his
father went to Dr. Gratzer’s office. However, they left the office
without completing the examination because Kyle was unwilling to
answer the questions on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (“MMPI”). Tr. 552-54. Although Kyle signed a second
consent form on May 10, 2006, which expressly permitted the
administration of an MMPI, he never rescheduled the examination.
The District continued to attempt its evaluation using its special
education staff.
On May 23, 2006, just days before graduation, Kyle saw Dr.
Judson Reaney, a behavioral pediatrician associated with the
Alexander Center. Dr. Reaney told Kyle that the Connor’s Continual
Performance Test previously administered by the Center was a
nonclinical instrument, and did not definitively determine whether
Kyle did or did not have ADHD. Dr. Reaney ultimately concluded
Kyle met the DSM-IV criteria for the ADHD diagnosis. He therefore
recommended the District continue to provide § 504 accommodations.
On June 2, 2006, the District moved to dismiss Kyle’s request
for a hearing because Kyle had received sufficient credits to
graduate with a regular diploma and, according to the District,
his IDEA claims were moot. The ALJ denied the motion. (Order
Denying Motion to Dismiss, June 8, 2006). On June 9, after Kyle
participated in the school’s graduation ceremony, the District
sought reconsideration of its dismissal motion. The hearing
13
officer granted reconsideration and dismissed the request for
hearing with prejudice. (Order, June 16, 2006). See also supra
note 1, at 1.
As set forth in note 1, this Court entered an Order on March
5, 2007, directing a full administrative hearing and decision. The
ALJ conducted a hearing on the merits regarding Kyle’s IDEA claims
and found (1) the District did not violate state or federal childfind
standards by failing to initiate a special education
evaluation of the student prior to the April, 2006, request; (2)
the student was not eligible for special education because he did
not require special instruction to initiate and complete tasks; (3)
the District’s accommodations were sufficient to allow the student
to make progress in regular education and to graduate from high
school; and (4) the District did not deny the student a free
appropriate education (“FAPE”). The ALJ made no conclusions as to
any other claims.
II. Analysis
A. Standards of Review
1. Administrative Agency’s Decision
Upon appeal from the final determination of a state
administrative process under the IDEA, this Court makes an
independent decision of the issues, giving due weight to the
administrative proceedings. Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1068
(8th Cir. 2006); Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607,
14
610 (8th Cir. 1997). Although, this Court accords less deference
to the state proceedings than required under the substantial
evidence test commonly applied in federal administrative law cases,
particular consideration is given to state officials’ educational
judgments. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., by and through her
Parent, C., 258 F.3d 769, 773-74 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. Motion to Dismiss Standard
To survive the District’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must
provide something more than a simple statement of facts creating a
suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). They must make factual
allegations which, when taken as true, are sufficient to “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Plaintiffs have
failed to meet this standard. The Court addresses each claim in
turn.
B. Preliminary Matters
Before considering the merits of plaintiffs’ allegations, the
Court considers whether this matter is barred by a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, standing, or mootness.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The District argues, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
that this Court is “bereft of subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain [plaintiffs’ education] claims” because Kyle graduated
15
from high school and moved to another district, thereby rendering
his claims moot. The District is incorrect; it misapprehends the
analytic distinction between subject matter jurisdiction, and
whether plaintiffs’ claims are ripe or justiciable. Simply put,
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs’
claims are not “so completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy.” Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo,
534 U.S. 426, 431 (2002). Plaintiffs’ claims survive the
District’s 12(b)(1) challenge.
2. Standing
The District next contends Timothy Strock lacks standing
because he cannot show a direct personal injury. The District is
incorrect. Parents have an independent stake in substantive
decisions regarding their children. Winkleman ex rel. Winkleman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2004 (2007). The IDEA
recognizes this when it provides procedural safeguards permitting
parents to obtain administrative and judicial review. M.P. ex rel.
v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 326 F.3d 975, 979-80 (8th Cir. 2003). Thus,
Timothy Strock is properly before the Court.
3. Mootness
The District next claims plaintiffs’ IDEA claim is moot,
arguing that Kyle’s graduation and move to another school district
cost him his claim to relief. The Court recognizes the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Thompson v. Bd. of the Special
12The Department of Education issued new IDEA regulations
effective Oct. 13, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46540 (Aug. 14, 2006).
Plaintiffs’ claims, if any, accrued April 3, 2006, prior to the
16
Sch. Dist. No. 1, finding a student’s IDEA claim moot after he left
his former school district without seeking any relief until after
his departure. 144 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 1998). In Thompson,
the old district was not responsible, since the plaintiff had moved
to another school and another district. Id. While this is true,
the Court also considers Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, where the
Eighth Circuit found a continuing controversy. 258 F.3d at 774-75.
In that case, as here, the student pursued her remedies, had a due
process hearing concerning the old district, and all issues had not
been fully adjudicated prior to her move to another district. Id.
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ IDEA claim is not moot. See
also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3
(1993) (continuing controversy remained post-graduation). With
these preliminaries concluded, the Court turns to the merits.
C. IDEA Merits
The IDEA provides disabled children access to a FAPE. Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487.
Among its purposes, the IDEA “ensure[s] that all children with
disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs
and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent
living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V. 2005).12 The IDEA
2006 Regulations. As a result, the later Regulations are not
applicable.
17
defines “FAPE” as:
special education and related services that (A)
have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without
charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved;
and (D) are provided in conformity with
the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (Supp. V. 2005).
The IDEA’s “child-find” obligation imposes on a school
district the affirmative duty to identify, locate, and evaluate all
children with disabilities within its jurisdiction. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(3). The duty is triggered if the District has reason to
suspect a disability, and to suspect that special education
services may be needed. (ALJ Decision, May 16, 2007, at 21). When
such suspicions exist, the district must evaluate the student
within a reasonable time after school officials have notice of
behavior likely to indicate a disability. Id. at 21-22. Here, the
ALJ found the District did not violate any state or federal childfind
obligation. Id. at 23.
When Mr. Strock enrolled Kyle, he told the school Kyle did not
require special education and had always been in regular classes.
The mere existence of an ADHD condition does not demand special
education. Children having ADHD who graduate with no special
18
education or any § 504 accommodation are commonplace. On these
facts, the ALJ found the District’s handling of Kyle’s condition
was reasonable in light of Kyle’s lack of motivation to turn in his
homework; his passing, and at times, higher performance on tests;
and his average scores on the Minnesota Basic Standards tests. Id.
The ALJ similarly found Kyle did not qualify for special education
under the “Other Health Disability” or “Special Learning
Disability.” Id. Based on a review of the record, and affording
due weight to the ALJ’s findings, the Court fully concurs in the
ALJ’s determinations and finds the District provided Kyle with a
FAPE.
The Court also finds Kyle’s alleged unsuccessful transition to
college affords him no relief. He was allowed to enroll at
Normandale Community College upon graduation. That he was required
to take certain remedial courses is neither unusual nor evidence of
“unsuccessful transition,” an entirely undefined term. Plaintiffs
make no effort to suggest the outlines of a successful college
transition, but the Court finds that being required to take a
course which approximately 60% of a student’s fellows must take is
scarcely evidence of unsuccessful transition. Kyle achieved
placement examination scores which were sufficient to allow him to
attend college. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Kyle’s
transition to Normandale Community College does not constitute
actionable “unsuccessful transition,” if indeed such a claim exists
19
at all.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ facile declaration that the
District failed to “make meaningful [Kyle’s] high school diploma,”
the law does not require the District to maximize Kyle’s potential.
See Bd. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-90. Consequently, plaintiffs
possess no legal right under the law to anything beyond the FAPE
Kyle received.
D. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiffs invoke § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA,
and the MHRA in alleging that the District discriminated against
Kyle on the basis of disability. The enforcement, remedies, and
rights are virtually identical under these statutes. Smith ex rel.
Townsend v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Minneapolis), 184 F.3d 764,
767 (8th Cir. 1999). Section 504 provides that:
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall . . . solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Title II of the ADA “prohibits qualified individuals with
disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity.” Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th
Cir. 2000). Under under the MHRA, discrimination against a person
because of disability is prohibited. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.13,
20
subd. 1. To recover under these statutes, plaintiffs must show
“gross misjudgment or bad faith” on the part of school officials.
Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 103 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir.
1996).
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations relating to these claims, even
if taken as true, are entirely insufficient to satisfy the
pleading standards elucidated in Bell Atlantic. Plaintiffs’
allegations do not even raise a legitimate speculation that the
District or its employees discriminated against Kyle at all, let
alone as a result of any disability. To the contrary, the Court
easily finds the District’s continuous efforts to accommodate the
wishes of Kyle and his father offer compelling evidence to the
contrary. Consequently, plaintiffs’ discrimination claims fail.
III. Conclusion
Because plaintiffs are unable to plead any set of facts, taken
as true, that entitle them to relief, the Court grants defendants’
motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 21, 2008
s/ James M. Rosenbaum
JAMES M. ROSENBAUM
United States Chief District Judge
21
 

 
 
 

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