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C.N. v. Willmar Public Schools: US District Court : EDUCATION - IDEA, Section 504, 1983 claims fail; jurisdiction declined over state law claims

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Civil No. 07-4774(DSD/JJG)
C.N., on her own behalf and
by and through her Parent and
Natural Guardian J.N.,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
Willmar Public Schools, ISD
No. 347, Michael Carlson, Chair,
Willmar Board of Education, in
his representative capacity,
Kathryn Leedom, Superintendent in
her personal and representative
capacities, Susan Smith, Supervisor
of Special Education, in her personal
and representative capacities,
Rebecca Simenson, Principal, in her
personal and representative
capacities, and Lisa Vander Heiden,
in her personal and representative
capacities,
Defendants.
Margaret OSullivan Kane, Esq., Kane Education Law, 1654
Grand Avenue, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55105, counsel for
plaintiff.
Nancy E. Blumstein, Esq., Sonya J. Guggemos, Esq. and
Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, 730 Second Avenue South, Suite
300, Minneapolis, MN 55402 and Laura T. Booth, Esq.,
Booth Law, 1820 Xenium Lane North, Plymouth, MN 55441,
counsel for defendants.
This matter is before the court upon defendants motions to
dismiss. Based on a review of the file and record, the proceedings
herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants defendants
motions.
2
BACKGROUND
This action arises from plaintiff C.N.s tenure at Lincoln
Elementary School (Lincoln) in Willmar, Minnesota. Born on March
10, 1998, C.N. underwent testing at the University of Minnesotas
Neuropsychology Clinic in September 2001 to determine whether she
experienced Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Tests revealed that
C.N. did not suffer from ASD but exhibited a communications
disorder and attentional and hyperactivity issues. At a later prekindergarten
assessment in 2003, C.N. was designated as
developmentally delayed with speech and language impairment.
C.N. began school at Jefferson Kindergarten in fall 2003 with
a special education individualized education program (IEP)
created collaboratively by the local education agency, parents,
teachers and behavioral service providers (the IEP team). The
behavior intervention plan (BIP) included in C.N.s IEP permitted
controlled procedures - such as restraint positions and seclusion -
when necessary. After several months of behavioral problems and
disruptions, Jefferson staff, officials from defendant Willmar
Public Schools, Independent School District No. 347 (the
District), and C.N.s mother, J.N., decided to reevaluate C.N.
Outside evaluator Tim Ardoff (Ardoff) from Southern Minnesota
Community Support Services conducted the functional behavioral
assessment of C.N. Based on Ardoffs findings, the District
transferred C.N. to Lincoln - another school within the Willmar
3
system. The IEP team also revised C.N.s IEP and BIP based, in
part, on Ardoffs suggestions. Over J.N.s alleged objections, the
BIP continued to allow for restraints and seclusion. (Compl.
37-38.) The IEP team revised C.N.s IEP annually, adjusting its
focus to language development but retaining a BIP that included
seclusion and restraint procedures to be employed when C.N. was a
danger to herself or others.
During her first through third grade years at Lincoln, C.N.
worked with defendant Lisa Van Der Heiden (Van Der Heiden), one
of the schools special education teachers. Although C.N. spent
time in mainstream classroom settings, Van Der Heiden worked with
her on mathematics, on reading and during times when behavioral
challenges arose. When C.N.s behavior became problematic, Van Der
Heiden used the seclusion and restraint methods set forth in the
BIP. Van Der Heiden documented the use of such techniques in daily
behavioral and communications logs, which she kept for every child
in her care.
Plaintiffs maintain that Van Der Heiden improperly and
overzealously used seclusion and restraint techniques on C.N.
Specifically, based on their own beliefs, the behavioral logs and
reports from classroom paraprofessionals, plaintiffs allege that
while instructing C.N., Van Der Heiden:
C developed a thinking desk for C.N., in which she required
C.N. to hold a physical posture for in excess of thirty
minutes or else face restraint;
4
C shouted and yelled at C.N.;
C pulled C.N.s hair;
C made sarcastic remarks to C.N. and belittled her; and
C on one occasion, denied C.N. the use of bathroom facilities,
resulting in an accident. (Compl. 44, 48, 63-66.)
Based on reports from the classroom paraprofessionals, the
Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) conducted an
investigation of Van Der Heiden in August 2006. After an eightmonth
inquiry, the MDE concluded that Van Der Heiden engaged in
maltreatment of C.N. by denying her access to the restroom. (Id.
70.) During the MDE investigation, the District placed Van Der
Heiden on administrative leave and conducted its own review of her
behavior. The Districts examination of Van Der Heiden - its third
in two years - confirmed that she had denied bathroom access to
C.N. but concluded that the incident was a lapse in judgment. (Id.
75-79.) Ultimately, the District dismissed the maltreatment
allegations against Van Der Heiden. She returned to Lincoln on
October 2, 2006, but was placed on leave again on October 6, 2006,
and had no further contact with C.N. A month later, J.N. withdrew
C.N. from Lincoln and enrolled her at St. Johns Catholic School in
Atwater, Minnesota, where C.N. studied for the remainder of the
third grade. J.N. enrolled C.N. in the Atwater public school
district for the 2007-2008 school year.
On October 17, 2007, plaintiffs requested a special education
administrative hearing and filed a complaint with the MDE alleging
5
that the District denied C.N. a free appropriate public education
(FAPE) while she attended Lincoln. The District moved to dismiss
the complaint based upon lack of jurisdiction because C.N. was no
longer a student in the District at the time of the action.
Plaintiffs argued that a physical and psychological safety
exception applied, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
dismissed plaintiffs claim for lack of jurisdiction on November
15, 2007. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the MDE on
November 19, 2007, but were denied access to the administrative
hearing system in the state of Minnesota. (Compl. 4.)
Plaintiffs now appeal the ALJs ruling and allege a host of
additional federal and state law claims against Van Der Heiden, the
District, and defendants Lincoln principal Rebecca Simenson
(Simenson), District board of education chairperson Michael
Carlson (Carlson), District superintendent Kathryn Leedom
(Leedom) and District supervisor for special education
programming Susan Smith (Smith) in their respective individual
and official capacities. Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
1400 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section
504"), 20 U.S.C. 794; the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; the right against unreasonable
seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. 1983; the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. Ch. 363A; and the
6
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA). Plaintiffs
further assert state law tort claims of assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, unreasonable seizure,
false imprisonment, negligent confinement, breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence. Defendants move to dismiss all claims except
plaintiffs appeal of the administrative dismissal of their due
process hearing.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a
complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. This statement
does not require detailed factual allegations so long as it
give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957). However, a court will dismiss a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted if, after taking all facts
alleged in the complaint as true, those facts fail to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
I. Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
Congress enacted the IDEA to ensure that all children with
disabilities have access to a free appropriate public education.
7
20 U.S.C. 1400(d). The IDEA seeks to accomplish this objective
through a complex statutory framework that grants substantive and
procedural rights to children and their parents. See Winkleman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 1999-2005 (2007).
A. Individual Defendants
As an initial matter, the court addresses plaintiffs IDEA
claims against defendants Van Der Heiden, Carlson, Leedom, Smith
and Simenson in their individual and official capacities. An
official capacity suit is in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity - in this case, the District.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Because plaintiffs
have already included the District as a defendant, plaintiffs IDEA
claims against the individual defendants are redundant. As to
defendants individual capacities, the IDEA does not authorize
recovery of damages against teachers or education officials. See
Bradley v. Ark. Dept. of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 957 n.6 (8th Cir.
2002); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996).
Instead, the IDEA only allows damages, where appropriate, from the
school district in question. See id.; 20 U.S.C. 1401(8)(A). For
these reasons, the court dismisses plaintiffs IDEA claims against
defendants Van Der Heiden, Carlson, Leedom, Smith and Simenson.
B. The District
To promote parental involvement in all matters concerning the
childs educational program, the IDEA allows parents to obtain
8
administrative and judicial review of decisions they deem
unsatisfactory or inappropriate. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
311-12 (1988). Thus, if parents are dissatisfied with a childs
IEP, they may request a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. 1415(f).
Under the Minnesota implementing statute for the IDEA, this due
process hearing must be held in the district responsible for
ensuring that a free appropriate public education is provided
according to state and federal law. Minn. Stat. 125A.091,
subdiv. 12. If a student changes school districts and does not
request a due process hearing, his or her right to challenge prior
educational services is not preserved. Thompson ex rel. Buckhanon
v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir.
1998). Subsequent challenges to the students previous education
become moot because the new school district is responsible for
providing a due process hearing. Id.
In this case, plaintiffs failed to initiate a due process
hearing while C.N. was enrolled at Lincoln. Instead, they waited
over a year after C.N. left Lincoln to assert IDEA claims against
defendants. By then, C.N. had attended both private and public
schools in Atwater, and plaintiffs had moved to the Atwater public
school district. Because the District was no longer responsible
for providing a FAPE to C.N. at the time of the hearing,
plaintiffs IDEA claim fails as a matter of law. See M.P., 326
F.3d at 980; Thompson, 144 F.3d at 578-79; see also M.M. ex rel.
9
L.R. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir.
2008). Accordingly, the court grants the Districts motion to
dismiss that claim.
II. Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 is a proscriptive, anti-discrimination statute
that prohibits discrimination on the part of governmental actors to
avoid due process and equal protection violations. M.P. ex rel.
K. & D.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.
2006). To establish a prime facie case of disability
discrimination under Section 504, a plaintiff must prove that she:
(1) is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) was denied
the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity receiving
federal funds; and (3) was discriminated against based on her
disability. Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 178 F.3d
968, 971 (8th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must show bad faith or gross
misjudgment to make a successful Section 504 violation claim. See
Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000);
Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982).
Allegations of negligence do not clear the hurdle set by the
explicit language of section 504. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d
524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Section 504 claim was properly
dismissed where complaint alleged failure to timely assess and
diagnose a student's disability), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871
(1998).
10
A. Individual Defendants
Plaintiffs assert Section 504 claims against defendants Van
Der Heiden, Carlson, Leedom, Smith and Simenson in their individual
and official capacities. As with the IDEA claims, the Section 504
claims against these defendants in their official capacities are
redundant to the claims against the District and are therefore
dismissed. See Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Assn,
Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 1998). Further, Section 504,
like the IDEA, does not authorize claims against school officials
in their individual capacities. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001
(2000); R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014,
2007 WL 552117, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2007). Accordingly, the
court dismisses all Section 504 claims against defendants Van Der
Heiden, Carlson, Leedom, Smith and Simenson.
B. The District
The pertinent obligation of [a school district] under Section
504 is the same as its obligation under the IDEA: To provide
disabled students with a free appropriate public education. Fick
ex rel. Fick v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 337 F.3d 968, 970
(8th Cir. 2003) (citing Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d
1027, 1034 (8th Cir. 2000)). Where a plaintiffs IDEA claim fails
11
for lack of jurisdiction, the court may still consider a Section
504 claim if it is wholly unrelated to the IEP process. M.P.,
439 F.3d at 868.
In this case, plaintiffs have not alleged a wholly unrelated
Section 504 claim. Plaintiffs assert that defendants failed to
identify, evaluate, and provide [C.N.] with a free appropriate
public education and ... physically and verbally abus[ed] her ...
by using restraints and seclusion punitively without the
Plaintiffs consent. (Compl. 88.) Such allegations are
intertwined with plaintiffs IDEA claim and the IEP process.
Indeed, plaintiffs Section 504 claim does little more than rehash
their IDEA claim. Accordingly, it also fails as a matter of law.
See Moubry ex rel. Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696 (Ely), 951
F. Supp. 867, 888 (D. Minn. 1996) (IDEAs exhaustion requirement
precludes litigants from circumventing procedural requirements by
bringing a related claim under a different federal statute); cf.
M.P., 439 F.3d at 868 (allowing Section 504 claim to proceed
despite IDEA dismissal because plaintiff alleged Districts failure
to protect him from student-initiated disability-based harassment).
III. 42 U.S.C. 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under the color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States
1 Plaintiffs assert 1983 claims against defendants for
violations of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the IDEA and Section 504. Alleged violations of the
IDEA and Section 504, however, may not serve as the basis of a
1983 action. See Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1033 (IDEA); Alsbrook, 184
F.3d at 1010-11 (Section 504). The court therefore dismisses these
claims.
12
... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law.
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely affords a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). The first task
for a court considering a 1983 claim is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. See id. at 271.1
A. The District
A municipality may only be liable under 1983 if a plaintiff
establishes the deprivation of a constitutional or federal
statutory right as a result of the municipalitys official custom
or policy. See Monell v. City of N.Y. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). Likewise, a municipality may not be held
vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees
unless it can be shown that the personnel was acting to implement
on official municipality custom or policy. See id.; Mettler v.
Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999); Wedemeier v. City
of Ballwin, Mo., 931 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs have
13
failed to identify any District custom or policy that defendant
school officials relied upon in allegedly violating C.N.s rights.
Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiffs 1983 claims against
the District.
B. Individual Defendants
The remaining defendants argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity from plaintiffs 1983 claims. Public
officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from
liability for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to the extent
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To
determine whether qualified immunity applies, the court considers
the objective legal reasonableness of an officials conduct in
light of the information he or she possessed at the time of the
alleged violation. See Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 961 (8th
Cir. 2005); Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2001).
An official will be immune if it is objectively obvious that a
reasonably competent official could have concluded that the
disputed action was proper. See Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335,
341 (1986).
The applicability of qualified immunity is a question of law
analyzed in two parts. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The court first determines whether the facts alleged are adequate
14
to show a constitutional violation, and, if so, whether the law
regarding the right allegedly violated was clearly established.
See id.; Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666-67 (8th
Cir. 1992). If a plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of
a constitutional right, no additional inquiry is necessary, and the
official is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects an individuals right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
To sustain a successful 1983 action based on a Fourth Amendment
violation, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that
it was unreasonable. See Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d
695, 702 (8th Cir. 1999). Fourth Amendment protections are
applicable in public schools, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
336-37 (1985), although the setting and purpose of actions
undertaken outside a typical law enforcement context profoundly
affect their reasonableness, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988). Specifically, a court measures the
reasonableness of a seizure based on the totality of the
circumstances. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846
(8th Cir. 2003).
In this case, plaintiffs argue that Van Der Heiden seized C.N.
by employing restraint techniques, a thinking desk, and a
15
seclusion room and that defendant school officials failed to stop
such seizures. Defendants maintain that such procedures are not
seizures because they were used as educational techniques consented
to as part of C.N.s IEP. The court need not decide the issue,
however, because such actions, if seizures, were reasonable.
Where an authorized professionals treatment of a disabled
individual is not a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards, her actions are
reasonable. See Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1030 (qualified immunity
proper for substantive due process claim against defendant who
recommended use of blanket restraint on disabled student). C.N.s
IEP - developed by educational specialists in conjunction with J.N.
and approved of annually by J.N. - detailed educational and
behavioral methods for C.N.s teachers and set the standard for
accepted practice. As noted, the IEP allowed the use of restraint
holds and seclusion. Van Der Heiden, therefore, was not
substantially departing from accepted professional judgment when
she used such methods on C.N. See Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of
Albuquerque Pub. Schs., - F.3d - , No. 07-2133, 2008 WL 3092955, at
*5-11 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 2008) (granting qualified immunity on
fourth amendment seizure claim when IEP called for timeouts and
seclusion). Indeed, Van Der Heiden was required to follow the IEP
and use these techniques to help manage C.N.s behavior. See
Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir.
2 Having determined that Van Der Heidens actions did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, the court finds that defendants
Carlson, Leedom, Smith and Simenson are equally without fault.
Even if the court found Van Der Heidens behavior unreasonable,
though, the remaining individual defendants would be entitled to
qualified immunity because plaintiffs have failed to identify how
Carlson, Leedom, Smith and Simenson seized C.N., were
deliberately indifferent to J.N.s concerns or substantially
departed from accepted professional judgment.
16
2003) (IDEA violation when school fails to follow essential IEP
elements); see also Couture, 2007 WL 3092955, at *7 (If we do not
allow teachers to rely on a plan specifically approved by the
students parents and which they are statutorily required to
follow, we will put teachers in an impossible position - exposed to
litigation no matter what they do.). Accordingly, plaintiffs have
not set forth facts establishing a cognizable Fourth Amendment
violation, and the individual defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim.2
2. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
a. Equal Protection
To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must establish
that she was treated differently than others similarly situated to
her. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th
Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs allege that no non-disabled student who
3 Plaintiffs refer to a procedural due process claim in both
their Complaint, (Compl. 100), and responsive memorandum, (Pls.
Resp. at 18), but provide no facts or analysis in either to support
that claim. Accordingly, the court addresses only the substantive
due process claim.
17
attended in the District was subjected to ... unreasonable and
punitive seizures, restraint and seclusion of their persons.
(Compl. 95.) The court has already determined, however, that the
alleged restraint techniques and seclusion C.N. experienced were
reasonable. Moreover, aside from the bare assertion of disparate
treatment, plaintiffs have offered no facts by which to compare
C.N.s treatment with that of other disabled and nondisabled
students at Lincoln or in the District. See DeBord v. Bd. of Educ.
of Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 126 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir.
1997); S.A.S. ex rel. W.S. v. Hibbing Pub. Schs., No. 04-3204, 2005
WL 2230415, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2005). Accordingly,
plaintiffs have not alleged a right to relief above the speculative
level, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that
claim.
b. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees substantive due process
that prevents the government from participating in conduct that
either shocks the conscience or interferes with the rights
consistent with liberty.3 See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419,
18
424 n.7 (8th Cir. 1999). Substantive due process protects against
arbitrary and oppressive government conduct. See County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-53 (1998).
Plaintiffs contend that defendants violated C.N.s right to
substantive due process by denying her a FAPE and engaging in
behavior that shocks the conscience of reasonable persons and is
intolerable in a civilized society. (Compl. 100, 97.) Again,
however, plaintiffs make a bald accusation without linking specific
facts to their claim. Moreover, having already determined that
allegations related to provision of C.N.s FAPE are procedurally
barred and that defendants behavior was reasonable, the court
cannot find that defendants alleged conduct violated plaintiffs
substantive due process rights. See generally Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (claims of seizure should be analyzed
under Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard and not the more
generalized notion of substantive due process). Qualified
immunity is therefore warranted on this claim.
IV. Minnesota State Law Claims
Plaintiffs assert state law violations of the MHRA and MGDPA
as well as tort claims of assault and battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, unreasonable seizure, false
imprisonment, negligent confinement, breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1367(a) permits
a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
19
law claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the
claims that fall within the courts original jurisdiction. A court
may in its discretion, however, decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); Gibson
v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006). Indeed, if the
federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims
should be dismissed as well. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996). The court thus declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state-law
claims and dismisses them without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 12, 17] are
granted;
2. Plaintiffs IDEA, Section 504, 1983, and constitutional
claims are dismissed with prejudice; and
3. Plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed without
prejudice.
Dated: August 19, 2008
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
 

 
 
 

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