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Quasius v. The Schwan Food Co.: US District Court : CIVIL PROCEDURE | EMPLOYMENT - some claims untimely & barred, some may proceed

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Robert T. Quasius,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil No. 08-575 (JNE/JJG)
ORDER
The Schwan Food Company and
Schwans Global Supply Chain, Inc., a
division of The Schwan Food Company,
Defendants.
Andrea F. Rubenstein, Esq., Schaefer Law Firm, LLC, appeared for Plaintiff Robert T. Quasius.
Kurt J. Erickson, Esq., Jackson Lewis LLP, appeared for Defendants The Schwan Food
Company and Schwans Global Supply Chain, Inc.
Robert T. Quasius brings this action against The Schwan Food Company (Food
Company) and Schwans Global Supply Chain, Inc. (Global), alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (2000), and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A.01-.41 (2006). The case is before
the Court on Defendants motion for dismissal, for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively,
for partial summary judgment, and for sanctions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
dismisses Quasiuss MHRA claims against Defendants. The Court also dismisses Quasiuss
ADA claims against Defendants to the extent they are based on discrete acts that occurred before
September 17, 2005. The Court denies Defendants motion for sanctions.
I. BACKGROUND
Quasius worked for Global as a packaging engineer manager from June 28, 2004, until
his termination on March 29, 2006. Quasius alleges that he is disabled because of an asthma
condition. Quasius contends that Defendants discriminated against him because of this condition
2
and denied his requests for accommodation. He also claims that his termination was retaliation
for his complaints about Defendants alleged discrimination.
Quasius filled out a Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) Employment
Discrimination Questionnaire on February 24, 2006, listing as his employer Schwans Global
Supply Chain, Inc., div. of the Schwan Food Company, Inc. On July 14, 2006, a charge of
discrimination naming The Schwan Food Company as the respondent was filed with the
MDHR. The description section of the charge stated that Quasius worked for Schwans Global
Supply Chain, Inc., a division of the Respondents company.
On August 24, 2006, counsel for the Food Company sent a letter to the MDHR arguing
that the Food Company was not Quasiuss employer. As they are in this suit, the Food Company
and Global were represented by the same counsel in the MDHR proceeding. On October 2,
2006, Quasius sent a responsive letter to the MDHR arguing that the charge should include both
the Food Company and Global as a joint employer and should name both entities as respondents.
In an affidavit filed in support of his response to this motion, Quasius claims that the MDHR
insisted that he sign an amended charge naming Global as the respondent. On December 13,
2006, an amended charge was docketed with the MDHR naming Schwans Global Supply
Chain, Inc. as respondent and striking through the phrase a division of the Respondents
company in the description section. Quasius claims in his affidavit that he signed the amended
charge because it appeared he had no other option. The MDHR found no probable cause
supported Quasiuss discrimination claim. He received his right-to-sue letter from the MDHR on
January 14, 2008. Quasius appealed the MDHRs decision on January 28, 2008, but the MDHR
rejected his appeal as untimely.
In addition to the MDHR charge, a parallel charge was filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The record does not indicate which entity was originally
3
named as the respondent in the EEOC charge or whether the EEOC charge was amended to
name Global as the respondent when the MDHR charge was amended. The record does indicate
that Quasius sent a copy of his letter arguing that the charge should name both the Food
Company and Global as respondents to the Milwaukee EEOC office. The EEOC adopted the
MDHRs findings and issued a right-to-sue letter on February 22, 2008. The EEOC sent a copy
of this letter to Global, but not to the Food Company.
Quasius filed his Complaint on February 28, 2008, and served Defendants on June 4,
2008. Defendants filed this motion on August 13, 2008, arguing that Quasiuss MHRA claims
are time-barred, that Quasiuss ADA and MHRA claims against the Food Company should be
dismissed because Quasius did not exhaust his administrative remedies against the Food
Company, and that Quasiuss ADA claims against Global are partially time-barred. Defendants
also seek attorney fees under the ADA, the MHRA, and 28 U.S.C. 1927 (2006).
II. DISCUSSION
In support of their respective positions, the parties presented matters outside the
pleadings. The parties agree that Defendants motion should be treated as a motion for partial
summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and must identify
those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant satisfies its
burden, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
4
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate, a court must look at the record and draw any inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A. MHRA Claims
1. MHRA Claims Against Global
Global argues that Quasiuss MHRA claims against it are time-barred. Under the
MHRA, a plaintiff who timely files an administrative charge with the MDHR may bring a civil
action . . . within 45 days after receipt of notice that the commissioner has dismissed a charge . . .
because the commissioner has determined that there is no probable cause to credit the
allegations. Minn. Stat. 363A.33, subd. 1(1). Global contends that Quasiuss MHRA claims
are time-barred because Quasius failed to serve Global within forty-five days after he received
notice of the MDHRs dismissal of his charge. Quasius responds that his MHRA claims against
Global are not time-barred because he filed this action on February 28, 2008, forty-five days
after he received the MDHRs notice of dismissal on January 14, 2008. The issue before the
Court therefore is whether a party brings a civil action under the MHRA by filing or by
serving a complaint.
Resolution of this issue turns on whether Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure or Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies. Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an action is commenced upon service of a summons and
complaint. See Appletree Square I, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir.
1994); Ochs v. Streater, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [a] civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court. If the federal rule applies, Quasiuss MHRA claims against Global
5
are not time-barred; if the state rule applies, Quasiuss MHRA claims against Global are timebarred.
The Court concludes that the Eighth Circuits decision in Appletree governs the
commencement of Quasiuss MHRA claims. One issue1 decided in Appletree was whether a
state law asbestos claim was eligible for revival under Minnesotas asbestos revival statute,
which provides that [a]n asbestos action revived or extended under this subdivision may be
begun before July 1, 1990. 29 F.3d at 1286 (citing and quoting Minn. Stat. 541.22, subd. 2
(West 1994)). Appletree filed its complaint in federal district court on June 29, 1990, but did not
serve W.R. Grace until July 3, 1990. Appletree argued that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, not Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, should control
commencement of Appletrees asbestos action. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument:
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 [(1980)], the Supreme Court held
that Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the
Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations. The
Court stated:
There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling
federal rule, an action based on state law which concededly would
be barred in the state courts by the state statute of limitations
should proceed through litigation to judgment in federal court
solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship
between the litigants.
Appletree, 29 F.3d at 1286 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Quasius suggests that the federal rule should control commencement of his MHRA
claims because the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, rather than diversity
jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit rejected a similar argument in Appletree:
1 Quasius asserts that the issue in Appletree was the date on which the statute of limitations
began to run on Appletrees asbestos claim. The Eighth Circuit did decide this issue, Appletree,
29 F.3d at 1284-86, but also considered the application of Minnesotas asbestos revival statute
and whether the federal or state rule governed commencement of the asbestos claim, id. at 1286.
The Court relies on this portion of Appletree.
6
Appletree attempts to distinguish Walker on the ground that jurisdiction in
that case was based on diversity of citizenship and jurisdiction in the present case
is based on a federal law (RICO). We note that Appletree pleaded both diversity
and federal question jurisdiction in its complaint and that both bases for
jurisdiction exist. In any event, we conclude that the rationale of Walker does not
change solely because of the fortuity that Appletree pleaded a federal claim along
with state claims. [I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on
which federal jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the
governing law. The state law claims would be barred in state court; Walker
dictates that they should not be allowed to proceed in federal court.
Appletree, 29 F.3d at 1286 (quotation marks and citations omitted). For the purposes of his
MHRA claims, Quasius brought this action when he served his summons and complaint on
Global on June 4, 2008, well after the forty-five days permitted under the MHRA. Quasiuss
MHRA claims against Global are time-barred.
2. MHRA Claims Against the Food Company
The Food Company asserts that Quasiuss MHRA claims against it should be dismissed
because the claims are time-barred and because Quasius failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies against the Food Company. The Food Company bases its exhaustion argument on the
removal of the Food Company as a respondent from the MDHR charge and the fact that the
MDHR right-to-sue letter did not name the Food Company.
The Court first turns to whether Quasiuss claims against the Food Company are timebarred.
If the MDHR right-to-sue letter applies to the Food Company because the charge
initially named it as respondent, Quasius had forty-five days from receipt of the letter to bring an
action against the Food Company. See Minn. Stat. 363A.33, subd. 1(1). Under Appletree,
Quasius did not bring this action against the Food Company until he served it on June 4, 2008.
Alternatively, if the MDHR right-to-sue letter was ineffective as to the Food Company
due to its removal from the charge, Quasius had one year from the date of his termination to
bring a civil action against the Food Company. See Minn. Stat. 363A.28, subd. 3 (A claim of
7
an unfair discriminatory practice must be brought as a civil action . . . within one year after the
occurrence of the practice.). Quasiuss termination occurred on March 29, 2006, more than a
year before he served the Food Company. Therefore, regardless of the effect of the amendment
of Quasiuss MDHR charge, his MHRA claims against the Food Company are time-barred.
B. ADA Claims
1. ADA Claims Against Global
Global contends that Quasiuss ADA claims are based on discrete acts and that they are
time-barred to the extent they are based on discrete acts that occurred more than 300 days before
Quasius filed his charge. Quasius responds that his ADA claims are based on a continuing
violation and are timely because the last discriminatory actQuasiuss terminationoccurred
within 300 days before he filed his charge.
The continuing violation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations in situations where a
continuing pattern forms due to discriminatory acts occurring over a period of time, as long as
least one incident of discrimination occurred within the limitations period. Treanor v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2000). Discrete discriminatory acts, however, are
not encompassed within the continuing violation doctrine and are not actionable if time barred,
even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 (2002); see also Taxi Connection v. Dakota, Minn., & E. R.R.
Corp., 513 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2008). Thus, whether Quasiuss ADA claims are partially
time-barred depends on whether the alleged discriminatory acts form a continuing violation or
are discrete discriminatory acts.
As set forth by the Supreme Court in Morgan, a discrete discriminatory act constitutes a
separate actionable unlawful employment practice and is easy to identify. 536 U.S. at 114.
Termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire are examples of discrete
8
discriminatory acts. Id. A hostile work environment, which by its very nature involves repeated
conduct, cannot be said to occur on any particular day because [i]t occurs over a series of
days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not
be actionable on its own. Id. at 115. The entire time period of the hostile work environment
may be considered for purposes of liability so long as an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period. Id. at 117.
Quasius argues that Defendants effectively denied him accommodation over time by
denying his requests for accommodation and refusing to engage in an interactive process.
According to Quasius, Defendants conduct is far more analogous to a continuing violation
[than] a discrete act. This argument is unpersuasive because employees feel the effects of
indisputably discrete acts, such a failure to promote or denial of transfer, over time. The
existence of an on-going effect on an employee does not convert a discrete act into a continuing
violation. The Court must focus on the time of the alleged discriminatory acts, not the time at
which the consequences of the acts became most painful. Taxi Connection, 513 F.3d at 825;
see Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding rejection
of proposed religious accommodation does not give rise to continuing violation even though
effect of rejection is felt so long as the employee remains employed).
Although the Eighth Circuit has not decided whether a denial of a request for
accommodation is a discrete act, other circuits have found such a denial to be a discrete act in
similar contexts. See, e.g., Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
denial of employees request for an accommodation for a disability under the Rehabilitation Act
was a discrete act); Elmenayer, 318 F.3d at 134-35 (holding denial of request for religious
accommodation was a discrete act). The Court finds the reasoning in these decisions persuasive.
A denial of a request for accommodation, like a failure to promote, is easily identifiable and can
9
occur in a single action. A denial of a request for reasonable accommodation can constitute an
actionable unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A). The Court therefore
concludes that a denial of a request for accommodation is a discrete act. See Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 114. Consequently, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to a series of such
denials, even if they are related. See id. at 114-15; Szedlock v. Tenet, 61 F. Appx. 88, 93 (4th
Cir. 2003) (series of denials of requests for accommodation does not constitute a continuing
violation). Therefore, Quasius may base his ADA claims only on discrete acts occurring within
the appropriate time period. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
Where a plaintiff has filed a charge alleging unlawful employment practices with a state
agency, as Quasius did, the plaintiff must file the charge within 300 days from the date of the
alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117 (2000); Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2005). Quasius filed his charge on July 14, 2006.2
Three hundred days before July 14, 2006, is September 17, 2005.3 Thus, to the extent Quasiuss
ADA claims against Global are based on discrete acts occurring before September 17, 2005, they
are time-barred.4 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
2 For the purposes of this motion, Global assumes that Quasiuss amended charge, filed on
December 13, 2006, relates back to his initial charge. The Court therefore calculates the cut-off
date based on the date Quasius filed his initial charge.
3 Global incorrectly calculates the cut-off date as May 9, 2005. The correct calculation is
to subtract 300 days from the date Quasius filed his charge. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (only
acts that occurred within the 300 days before the date plaintiff filed his charge are actionable).
4 Quasius may still use discrete acts occurring before September 17, 2005, as background
evidence in support of his timely filed claims. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.
10
2. ADA Claims Against the Food Company
a. Exhaustion of Remedies
The Food Company contends that Quasiuss ADA claims should be dismissed because
Quasius failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against the Food Company.5 Quasius
responds that he may proceed against the Food Company because the Food Company and Global
are a single integrated enterprise.
Generally, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge against a defendant before suing the
defendant for violating Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 12117(a) (incorporating Title VIIs
powers, remedies, and procedures, including the exhaustion requirement). Despite this general
requirement, omission of a partys name from the EEOC charge does not automatically mandate
dismissal of a subsequent action. Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985). An
action may proceed against a party not named in an EEOC charge (1) where an unnamed party
has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has
been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings, or (2) where there is
sufficient identity of interest between the respondent and the [unnamed party] to satisfy the
intention . . . that the [unnamed party] have notice of the charge and the EEOC have an
opportunity to attempt conciliation. Id.
With respect to the first exception, it is unclear from the record whether the original
charge filed with the EEOC named the Food Company or Global as the respondent. If the EEOC
charge originally named the Food Company, then the Food Company is not an unnamed party.
The Food Company argues that, even if it was named, Quasiuss amendment of the MDHR
5 The Food Company frames its exhaustion argument as an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the Food
Company must prove. See Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Ctr., 481 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir.
2007) (per curiam). Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Quasiuss claims
against the Food Company.
11
charge creates an expectation that the Food Company will not be named in the lawsuit. This
argument is unpersuasive. The Food Company should have anticipated that Quasius would name
it as a defendant in a lawsuit regardless of any amendment, particularly in light of the fact that it
was the Food Companys argument that prompted the amendment of the MDHR chargeover
Quasiuss objection.
Even if the removal of the Food Company from the charge converted the Food Company
into an unnamed party or if it was never named on the EEOC charge, Quasius has raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Food Company had actual notice of and the
opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings because the same attorney represented the
Food Company and Global before the MDHR and the EEOC. See Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg.
Co., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 (D. Minn. 1992). Therefore, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the first exception applies to the Food Company.
With respect to the second exception, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
against the Food Company will not foreclose Quasiuss ADA claims if there is a sufficient
identity of interest between the Food Company and Global. See Greenwood, 778 F.2d at 451.
For the purposes of notice and conciliation, there is a sufficient identity of interest when the
named and unnamed organizations are a single employer. See Sedlacek v. Hach, 752 F.2d 333,
335-36 (8th Cir. 1985). Courts examine various factors to determine whether organizations are a
single employer, including: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3)
centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. Artis v.
Francis Howell N. Band Booster Assn, 161 F.3d 1178, 1184 (8th Cir. 1998).
Here, the record contains evidence demonstrating that there is a subsidiary/parent
relationship between The Food Company and Global and that the two entities shared offices. A
Senior Director of Human Resources for the Food Company worked with Quasiuss supervisor
12
on Quasiuss improvement plan. The benefits administrator for the Food Company requested
and received a medical evaluation of Quasius. In several e-mails, Quasiuss supervisor identified
himself as an employee of the Food Company. Finally, Quasiuss job description displays a
The Schwan Food Company logo and includes a statement that it is the policy of The Schwan
Food Company to recruit, hire, assign and promote employees. For these reasons, there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Food Company and Global are a single employer
for purposes of the notice and conciliation requirements of Title VII as incorporated in the ADA
and whether those requirements were fulfilled for purposes of Quasiuss claims against the Food
Company. Therefore, even if Quasius failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against the
Food Company, this failure will not foreclose his ADA claims.
b. Estoppel, Admissions, and Election of Remedies
The Food Company raises three additional arguments concerning whether it was
Quasiuss employer. First, it argues that amending the MDHR charge estops Quasius from
arguing that the Food Company is his employer. In support of this argument, the Food Company
cites several cases involving affidavits or testimony containing unexplained and sudden
departures from deposition testimony used to artificially create a fact issue in response to a
motion for summary judgment. These cases are inapposite. Quasius states in his affidavit that
he did not want to sign the amended MDHR charge and only did so because he believed he had
no other option. This statement is consistent with the record, including his letter arguing that his
charge should name both the Food Company and Global as respondents. Quasiuss decision to
sign the amended MDHR charge does not estop him from suing the Food Company.
Second, the Food Company argues in its reply brief that Quasius failed to timely respond
to several requests for admission. In particular, Quasius failed to respond to a request stating:
[f]or your employment that you describe in your Complaint, admit that you were not employed
13
by [the Food Company.] Failing to timely respond to a request for admission results in the
matter being deemed admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Quasius has not moved to
withdraw or amend his response pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b).
It is evident from Quasiuss memorandum in opposition to summary judgment and
counsels arguments at the hearing that Quasius claims he was employed by the Food Company.
Whether an employment relationship existed between Quasius and the Food Company is central
to Quasiuss ADA claims against the Food Company. Although the Court is permitted to grant
summary judgment on the basis of matters deemed admitted, the Court is not required to do so.
See Kosta v. Connolly, 709 F. Supp. 592, 594-95 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Pleasant Hill Bank v. United
States, 60 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
Further, in seeking an admission as to the existence of an employment relationship
between Quasius and the Food Company, the relevant request seeks admission of a legal
conclusion. See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312-13 (8th Cir. 1997).
Requests for admissions of legal conclusions are inappropriate. See Warnecke v. Scott, 79 F.
Appx. 5, 6 (5th Cir. 2003); Lakehead Pipe Line Co., Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 177
F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997); 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Richard L.
Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure 2255 (2d ed. 1994). For these reasons, the Court
declines to grant summary judgment at this time on Quasiuss ADA claims against the Food
Company on the basis of his failure to timely respond to Defendants requests for admission.
Should Quasius seek to amend or withdraw his responses to these requests, Quasius shall make
such a motion before the magistrate judge within 30 days of this order.
Finally, the Food Company contends that the doctrine of election of remedies prohibits
Quasius from naming the Food Company as a defendant in this suit. The Food Company cites
no authority applying the doctrine of election of remedies to the naming of a respondent in a
14
charge of discrimination. In the absence of any such authority, the Court declines to apply the
doctrine of election of remedies to Quasiuss ADA claims against the Food Company.
c. Partial Time-Barring
The Food Company does not join in Globals argument that Quasiuss ADA claims are
partially time-barred. The Court may grant summary judgment sua sponte when the party
against whom judgment will be entered was given sufficient advance notice and an adequate
opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted. Madewell v.
Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1048 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).
In their Answer, both defendants raised partial time-barring based on the 300-day
limitation in the ADA as an affirmative defense. Quasius addressed the legal and factual
arguments relating to the partial time-barring of his ADA claims in his response to Globals
motion.6 The Court concludes that Quasius was given sufficient advance notice that the Court
would consider whether his ADA claims are partially time-barred and had an adequate
opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted. See id. at 1049-50;
Furkin v. Smikun, 237 F. Appx. 86, 90 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming district courts sua sponte
grant of summary judgment for non-moving defendant on statute of limitations grounds when
moving defendant raised issue). Therefore, to the extent Quasius bases his ADA claims against
the Food Company on discrete acts occurring before September 17, 2005, they are time-barred.
C. Sanctions
Defendants seek sanctions in the form of attorney fees pursuant to the ADA, the MHRA,
and 28 U.S.C. 1927. The Court notes that Quasiuss ADA claims against the Food Company
6 Portions of Quasiuss response to Globals partial time-barring argument refer to the
defendants. Thus, Quasius may have directed his response to both Global and the Food
Company.
15
and Global remain. Therefore, the Court declines to rule on the availability or amount of
attorney fees at this time.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants motion for partial summary judgment and for sanctions
[Docket No. 9] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. The deadline for Quasius to bring a motion to withdraw or amend his
responses to Defendants requests for admissions is December 14, 2008.
3. Counts I-II of Quasiuss Complaint [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE to the extent they are based on discrete acts occurring
before September 17, 2005.
4. Counts III-V of Quasiuss Complaint [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: November 14, 2008
s/ Joan N. Ericksen
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District Judge
 

 
 
 

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